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move.	Does	 the	perceiver	see	 the	yellow	ball	as	causing the	red	ball	
to	move	 or	merely	 a	 succession of	 events?	At	 stake	 here	 is	whether	
sight	—	and	 the	 senses	more	 generally	—	represent	 causal	 properties	
and	relations.	David	Hume	famously	argues	that	we	lack	any	sensory	
impression	of	causation.	In	An Enquiry Concerning Human Understand-
ing,	Hume	writes:
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More	 recently,	 Steven	 Nadler	 has	 argued	 that,	 according	 to	 Mal-
ebranche,	 “experience,	whether	of	a	 single	or	multiple	 instances,	 re-
veals	 only	 a	 sequence	 of	 events,	what	Hume	more	 famously	 called	
‘succession’	and	 ‘constant	 conjunction.’	 It	does	not exhibit	necessary	
relations	between	those	events”	(2000,	118).	And	Peter	Kail	holds	that	












3.	 Thus,	 Malebranche	 anticipates	 views	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 perception	




































brain	 (OC	 i.	 129/LO	 52).	At	 the	 third	 grade,	 a	 psycho-physiological	

























expressions	 such	 as	 “visual	 experience”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 overall	 con-







	 colin	chamberlain The Most Dangerous Error
philosophers’	imprint	 –		4		–	 vol.	21,	no.	10	(may	2021)









this	 question	 is	 that	 Malebranche	 distinguishes	 two	 kinds	 of	 judg-
ments,	 corresponding	 to	 the	 two	basic	 faculties	of	 the	mind:	under-
standing	 and	 will.10	 Although	 judgment	 “properly	 speaking”	—	that	




is	 the	perception	of	 “a	single	 thing	without	any	relation	 to	anything	
else	whatsoever,”	Malebranche	holds	that	a	“judgment on	the	part	of	










9.	 I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	at	Philosophers’ Imprint for	pressing	









white	—	in	virtue	of	 a	natural	 judgment	with	 this	 very	 content.	This	











Malebranche	 is	 clearer	 about	 the	 role	 natural	 judgments	 play	 in	
helping	 construct	 sensory	 experience	 than	 he	 is	 about	 the kind	 of	
mental	state	natural	judgments	are	supposed	to	be.	Malebranche’s	in-
sistence	on	 the	 sensory	 character	of	natural	 judgments	underscores	
that	 these	mental	 states	 partially	 constitute	 sensory	 experience	 and	
contribute	their	contents	 to	the	appearances	(OC	i.	97/LO	34;	OC	i.	
130/LO	52;	OC	i.	158/LO	69;	OC	i.	119–20/LO	46–7;	OC	xv.	17).8	But	
we	 already	 knew	 that.	Malebranche	 also	 characterizes	 natural	 judg-
ments	 negatively	 by	 distinguishing	 them	 from	 free	 judgments,	 that	
is,	judgments	“properly	speaking”	(OC	i.	97/LO	34).	As	I	mentioned	
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mistaken,”	then,	a fortiori,	they	can	be	evaluated	as	true	or	false.14	Thus,	

















ers	 should	be	 read	 in	 the	 same	way.	When	Nadler	 says	 that	 experi-
ence	“reveals	only	a	sequence	of	events,”	maybe	he’s	saying	that	 for	
Malebranche,	 experience	does	not	 successfully reveal	 anything	more	
than	 the	 sequence.	Nadler’s	 reading	would	 then	be	 consistent	with	
mine	 (2000,	 118).	And	 similarly	 for	McCracken’s	 claims	about	what	
the	senses	“show”	us	(1983,	258–9).	











will	and	does	not	 imply	any	endorsement	on	 the	part	of	 its	 subject.	
One	might	consider	the	proposition	that	narwhals	exist,	for	example,	
without	yet	endorsing	this	claim.11
In	 referring	 to	 this	 compositional	 operation	—	namely,	 form-
ing	 a	mental	 state	with	propositional	 content	—	as	 a	 judgment,	Mal-






while	 judgments	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	will	 are	 judgment-like	 in	 being	
free	 acts	 of	 affirmation	 or	 denial.	 This	 departure	 is	 a	 feature	 rather	
than	 a	 bug.	As	 Peter	Geach	 (1980,	 51)	 points	 out,	we	 can	 entertain	





standing.	They	 represent	 the	 relations	between	 two	or	more	 things	
and,	hence,	are	truth-apt	or	have	propositional	content.13	The	visual	
experience	of	a	yellow	billiard	ball,	for	instance,	is	grounded	in	a	nat-
ural	 judgment	with	at	 least	 four	 terms:	 that	 there	 is	an object that	 is	
spherical and	yellow located	some distance in front of her.	Malebranche	al-
ludes	to	this	complexity	when	he	describes	natural	judgments	as	com-
pound	sensations.	“Natural	judgment,”	Malebranche	writes,	“is	but	a	



























judgments	 inject	 their	contents	 into	sensory	experience.	But	natural	




requires	 that	 these	 experiences	 have	 representational	 content.	Mal-
ebranche	holds	that	sensory	experience	—	that	is,	the	conscious	result	
of	 combining	 sensations	 and	 natural	 judgments	—	makes	 proposals	
about	what	the	world	is	like	to	the	subject’s	point	of	view.	Someone’s	
experience	might	present	a	picture	of	the	world	in	which	grass	is	green	
and	 rubies	are	 red.	 It	 is	 then	up	 to	her	 to	decide	whether	 to	assent	
to	this	picture	(or	not).	If	sensory	experiences	make	proposals	about	












whether	 third-grade	 sensations	—	like	 a	 sensation	of	 red	—	are	 inten-




intentional	 is	orthogonal,	however,	 to	whether	sensory experiences	or	
perceptions	—	that	is,	the	conscious	result	of	combining	sensations	and	
natural	judgments	—	are	representational.	Sensations	and	sensory	ex-
periences	 are	different	 kinds	of	mental	 states,	with	 correspondingly	
different	 properties.	 Premises	 about	 whether	 sensations	 are	 inten-
tional	 and/or	 representational	 do	 not	 straightforwardly	 imply	 con-
clusions	 about	whether	 sensory	 experiences	 are	 intentional	 and/or	
representational.	
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that	God	 is	 the	only	 true	or	genuine	cause.	God	 is	 the	only	 creator	



















kinds	 of	 properties	 they	 represent.	One	 key	 insight	 governs	 his	 ap-
proach:	 that	 the	 senses	 are	 “given	 to	 us	 for	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	
body”	(OC	i.	76/LO	23;	see	also	OC	i.	376/LO	195).19	The	senses	are	
not	 designed	 for	 abstract	metaphysical	 speculation.	They	 are	 rough	
and	 ready	 tools	 for	 survival.	 “[T]hrough	pleasure	and	pain,	 through	
agreeable	 and	 disagreeable	 tastes,	 and	 by	 other	 sensations,”	 Male-
branche	explains,	 the	senses	 “quickly	advise	 the	soul	of	what	ought	
and	ought	not	to	be	done	for	the	preservation	of	life”	(OC	i.	76–7/LO 







occasional	 law	 governing	 the	mind-body	 union	—	takes	 the	 current	






ebranche	explains	 in	 the	Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion. “That	
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position	 reveals	 a	 surprising	point	of	 consensus:	namely,	 that	Male-




Aristotle	 as	 endorsing	 both	 planks	 mentioned	 above:	 (i)	 material	
















(d) The Target Thesis
When	 I	 claim	 that	 sensory	 experience	 represents	 causation	 for	Mal-
ebranche,	I	am	saying	that	(a)	the	conscious	result	of	combining	sen-















3. Malebranche on Aristotelian Accounts of Causation
My	 first	 argument	 for	 attributing	 the	 target	 thesis	 to	 Malebranche	
turns	on	the	way	he	situates	himself	in	relation	to	his	Aristotelian	op-
ponents.	These	opponents	include	Aristotle	himself	but	also	Averroes	
and	 Francisco	 Suárez.	Malebranche	understands	 the	Aristotelian	 ac-
count	of	causation	as	having	both	metaphysical	and	epistemic	planks.22 
First	and	foremost,	the	Aristotelians	hold	that	material	things	are	true	



























causes	 are	 not	 perceived;	 and	 since	 everything	 whose	
causes	are	not	perceived	is	still	unknown	by	nature	and	
must	be	 investigated,	 it	 follows	necessarily	 that	what is 
not unknown has causes which are perceived.	(Ibid.,	emphasis	
added)27
Sometimes	an	event’s	 causes	are	hidden	 from	us,	 in	which	case	we	








timony	of	the	senses	[Cela paroît tel aux yeux, & c’en est as-
sez pour ce Philosophe, car il suit presque toûjours le témoinage 





as	pushing the	other	or	as	setting it into motion,	which	is	the	position’s	
second	plank.24
In	 the	next	paragraph,	Malebranche	 turns	his	attention	 to	Aristo-
tle’s	followers,	such	as	Averroes	and	Suárez:25
Those	who	combat	the	view	of	certain	theologians	who	





opposite	 view,	 says	 the	 great	Averroes,	 are	 out	 of	 their	
minds.	 Almost	 all	 the	 Peripatetics	 say	 that	 those	 who	
deny	 this	 efficacy	must	 be	 convinced	 through	 sensible	
proofs	and	must	 thus	be	obliged	 to	admit	 that	 they	are	
capable	of	being	acted	upon	and	hurt.	This	is	a	judgment	

















and	 who	 always	 discloses	 things	 as	 they	 are	 in	 them-
selves,	 or	whether	 it	 is	 the	 body,	which	 speaks	 only	 in	
self-interest	and	which	discloses	 things	only	 in	 relation	
to	 the	 preservation	 and	 convenience	 of	 life.	 For	 in	 the	
end,	what prejudices shall we not justify if we take the 
senses as judges, to which practically all prejudices owe 



















disagreed	with	 the	Aristotelians	 on	 both	 these	 fronts,	 his	 failure	 to	
mention	the	former	point	of	disagreement	would	be	odd.	Moreover,	
hence are	 known	 to	 us.	 Thus,	 Averroes	 holds	 the	 view	 that	 Male-
branche	attributes	to	Aristotelians	more	generally.28 
Suárez	also	appeals	to	sensory	experience	to	defend	the	efficacy	of	
secondary	 causes.	 In	 the	 section	of	 the	Metaphysical Disputations en-
titled	“Whether	Created	Things	Really	Effect	Anything,”	he	argues	that	





















Malebranche	 does	 not	 dispute	 the	 Aristotelians’	 claim	 that	 the	
senses	represent	bodies	as	causally	efficacious.	Instead,	he	takes	issue	
with	the	trust	the	Aristotelians	place	in	their	senses:	
28.	For	 more	 on	 Malebranche’s	 familiarity	 with	 the	 medieval	 Islamic	 debate	
about	causation,	see	Nadler	(1996).
29.	For	more	discussion	of	Suárez	on	the	observability	of	causation,	see	Freddoso	
(2002, xxxix, xlix, liii–lv).	
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Malebranche	claims	 that	 “our	senses	represent	 the	Sun	[nos sens 
nous représentent]	 as	 the	universal	 cause,	which	gives	 life	 and	move-
ment	to	all	things”	(OC	ii.	311/LO	447,	emphasis	added).	When	a	sun-
bather	basks	 in	 the	sun,	 for	example,	he	experiences	 the	sun	as	 the	
true	cause	of	warmth	and	light.	This	passage	is	evidence	for	my	read-
ing	 as	Malebranche	uses	 explicitly	 representational	 language	 in	 his	
own	voice.	
Malebranche	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	 senses	 represent	 leeks	 and	
onions	as	 the	 causes	of	 the	 sensations	 they	produce	and,	hence,	 as	
lesser	 divinities:	 “certainly	 men,	 who	 listen	 to	 the	 reports	 of	 their	



























































ers	and	 fruits,	gives	 life	 to	animals,	and,	penetrating	by	
its	heat	even	to	the	bowels	of	the	earth,	produces	stones,	





























not as we sense them [si nous voulons dire les choses comme nous les con-
cevons, & non pas comme nous les sentons]”	(OC	ii.	313/LO	448,	empha-
sis	added;	see	also	OC	ii.	315/LO	450).	The	intellect	tells	us	that	God	





When	 I	 see	one	ball	 strike	another,	my	eyes	 tell	me,	or	
seem	 to	 tell	 me,	 that	 the	 one	 is	 truly	 the	 cause	 of	 the	
motion	it	impresses	on	the	other,	for	the	true	cause	that	




places,	 they	 cannot	 communicate	 a	 power	 they	 do	 not	
have	and	could	not	communicate	even	if	it	were	in	their	







whereas	 reason	 accurately	 represents	God	 as	 the	 only	 true	 cause.30 
The	next	paragraph	continues	in	a	similar	vein:
When	I	open	my	eyes,	it	seems	evident	to	me	that	the	Sun	
is	 brilliant	with	 light	 [Quand j’ouvre les yeux, il me paroît 
évident que le Soleil est tout éclatant de lumiére],	that	not	only	
30.	The	point	of	the	qualification	“seem	to	tell	me”	is	that	his	eyes	only	seem to	
provide	knowledge	of	what	causes	what.	Malebranche	is	emphasizing	that	
the	expression	 “the	 senses	 tell	me”	 is	not a	 success	 term	 for	him.	See	Pyle	
(2003,	99)	for	an	alternative	reading	of	this	passage.















By	emphasizing	 that	 the	 senses	 conflict	with	occasionalism,	Mal-






In	 contrast,	 my	 opponents	—	like	 Church,	 Rome,	 McCracken,	
Nadler,	Pyle,	and	Kail	—	deny	that	the	senses	and	reason	conflict.	If	the	




my	 opponents	 need	 to	 explain	 away	 all	 the	 passages	we	 looked	 at	
above	 in	which	Malebranche	 describes	 a	 clash	 between	 sense	 and	
reason	on	this	point.	
Pyle	argues	that	although	the	senses	do	not	themselves	represent	


































31.	 I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	at	Philosophers’ Imprint for	pressing	
me	to	clarify	this	point.	
	 colin	chamberlain The Most Dangerous Error
philosophers’	imprint	 –		14		– vol.	21,	no.	10	(may	2021)
conflict	with	occasionalism.	The	senses	say	“the	opposite”	of	the	true	




would	 be	 to	 blame	 for	 this	 error	 (2003,	 100).	 But	 presumably	God	
would	not	deceive	us	in	this	way,	which	might	seem	to	count	against	
my	reading.	
Pyle’s	objection	 is	 a	 specific	 instance	of	 a	more	general	problem	






66).	 This	 suggests	 that	 Malebranche	 can	 reconcile	 God’s	 goodness	












If	 the	mind	 saw	 in	 bodies	 only	 what	 is	 really	 in	 them,	
without	 being	 aware	 of	 what	 is	 not	 in	 them,	 it	 would	
neither	love	objects	nor	make	use	of	them	without	great	
pain; thus it is necessary, as it were, that objects should 










This	 alternative	 account	 does	not	fit	 the	 texts.	 The	 texts	 suggest	
that	Malebranche	—	like	Averroes	—	takes	occasionalism	to	clash	with	
“the	manifest	 evidence”	 of	 the	 senses	 (Pyle	 2003,	 99).	 Let’s	 take	 an-
other	look	at	some	of	the	passages	we	saw	above:
•	We	must	 therefore	say	 that	 there	 is	nothing	but	God’s	
will	that	can	move	bodies,	if	we	want	to	say	things	as	we	
conceive	 them,	and not as we sense them.	 (OC	 ii.	313/LO 
448,	emphasis	added)
























The	 cause	of	 their	 error	 is	 that	men	never	 fail	 to	 judge	
that	a	thing	is	 the	cause	of	a	given	effect	when	the	two	









the	cause	of	 these	movements.	 (OC	 i.	 426/LO	 224;	 see	
also	OC	x.	59)
Malebranche	suggests	that	human	beings	have	a	natural	tendency	to	
confuse	 constant	 conjunction	with	 causal	 connection.36	 If	 someone	










themselves lack [ainsi il est comme nécessaire qu’ils parois-



















In	 light	 of	 the	passages	we	have	 looked	 at	 so	 far,	why	might	 some-
one	—	such	as	McCracken,	Nadler,	Pyle,	 or	Kail	—	read	Malebranche	
as	rejecting	any	sensory	impression	of	causality?	There	are	four	main	
sources	 of	 textual	 evidence	 for	 my	 opponents’	 reading:	 (a)	 Mal-





terpretation	by	 showing	 that	 the	 case	 for	my	opponents’	 reading	 is	
35.	 Although	Simmons	(2008,	83)	discusses	this	passage,	she	does	not	empha-
size	Malebranche’s	 claim	 that	 experiencing	bodies	 as	 causing pleasure	 and	
pain	is	practically	necessary	for	the	preservation	of	life.	






and	penetrates	 it,	 and	 it	 lets	 itself	 be	 so	 seduced	by	 its	
body	and	by	 those	 surrounding	 it	 that	 it	 imagines	find-
ing	in	them	its	perfection	and	happiness.	(OC	iii.	203/LO 
657)
Malebranche’s	 claim	 that	 “the	 mind	 constantly	 spreads	 itself	 exter-
nally”	 is	 somewhat	unclear.	My	opponents	argue	 that	 the	metaphor	
of	 “spreading”	 suggests	 that	 the	 senses	 do	 not	 of	 themselves	 repre-
sent	causality	but	that	this	representation	is	added	by	the	mind	of	the	
observer.	If	the	representation	of	causation	were	already	there,	given	
in	 experience,	 then	why	would	 the	mind	need	 to	project	 or	 spread	
anything	onto	it?38

















We	 can	 resist	 my	 opponents’	 reading	 of	 this	 passage,	 however,	
by	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 judgment	 is	 equivocal	 for	Mal-






could	plausibly	claim	 that	 the	confusion	 is	non-sensory,	a	matter	of	
belief	rather	than	experience.	But	he	could	also	be	talking	about	natu-
ral	judgments,	in	which	case	he	would	be	saying	that	the	confusion	of	
constant	conjunction	and	causation	 is	built	 into	 the	contents	of	sen-
sory	experience	itself.37 In	other	words,	Malebranche	could	be	saying	
that	our	sensory	systems	are	hardwired	to	represent	cases	of	constant	
conjunction	 as	 if	 they	were	 cases	of	 true	 causation.	 So	 it	 looks	 like	
this	 first	 argument	 is	 neutral	 between	 my	 opponents’	 reading	 and	
mine.	Moreover,	the	claim	that	we	are	inclined	to	freely	judge	that	two	






many	philosophers	attribute	 “a	purely	 imaginary	power”	 to	material	
37.	 Pyle	(2003,	99–100)	classifies	the	judgment	in	question	as	natural	but	mis-
characterizes	 natural	 judgments	 in	 two	ways.	 First,	 Pyle	 describes	 natural	
judgments	as	“resistible,”	as	if	we	could	choose	not	to	make	them.	But	Mal-
ebranche	holds	that	natural	judgments	are	unavoidable.	That’s	the	point	of	
describing	natural	 judgments	 as	 occurring	 “in	us,	without	 us,	 and	 even	 in	
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And	those	appearances	exhibit	no	real	causation.	…	The	
true	 cause	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 our	 eyes	because [1]	 no	
necessary	 connection	 is	 disclosed	 by	 sense-perception,	
and	 [2]	 necessary	 connection	 is	 the	 defining	 character-











I’m	 not	 convinced	 that	 Malebranche	 accepts	 (1).	 Admittedly,	 Male-
branche	writes	that	“there	is	nothing	but	the	infinitely	perfect	being	





sens nous le disent]”	 that	 the	 collision	of	bodies	 “is	absolutely neces-
sary for	their	motion	[soit absoluement necessaire à leur movement]”	(OC 












sensation	of	whiteness	 to	snow	or	 to	see	 it	as	white,	or	
to	assign	the	pain	to	the	pricked	finger	rather	than	to	the	
thorn	that	pricks	it.	All this occurs in us independently of us 
















Malebranche’s	 view	 that	 causation	 requires	 necessary	 connection	
might	seem	to	entail	that	we	lack	a	sensory	impression	of	causality.	As	
Church	writes:
Malebranche	 makes	 the	 point,	 both	 in	 the	 chapter	 to	
which	Hume	refers	and	in	its	Éclaircissement,	that	in	our	
perception	of	one	ball	as	it	impinges	on	another,	we	dis-
cover	 nothing	 more	 than	 appears	 in	 sense-perception.	











you	[ou du moins ne crois en cela que ce que tes sens te disent].	
Your	eyes,	 in	 truth,	 tell	 you	 that	when	a	body	at	 rest	 is	
struck	by	another,	it	begins	to	move	[Tes yeux à la vérité te 
disent, que lors qu’un corps en repos est choqué, il cesse d’être 
en repos].	Believe	what	you	see	here:	for	it	is	a	fact	and	the	
senses	are	good	enough	witnesses	when	it	comes	to	such	
facts.	 But	 do	 not	 judge	 that	 bodies	 have	 in	 themselves	
some	motive	force,	or	that	they	can	communicate	such	a	
force	to	other	bodies	when	they	strike	them,	for	you	see	
nothing	like	that	[tu n’en vois rien].	(OC	x.	48)40
We	see	that	when	a	body	at	rest	is	struck	by	another,	it	begins	to	move.	
But,	the	Word	suggests,	we	are	mistaken	to	think	that	we	see	the	ex-
ercise	of	any	power	or	motive	 force.	We	misinterpret	 the	 testimony	
of	 sight	when	we	 take	 ourselves	 to	 see	 finite	 things	 as	 standing	 in	
genuine	 causal	 relations.	 And	 presumably	 the	Word	 expresses	Mal-
ebranche’s	considered	position.	
The	final	 sentence	of	 this	passage	might	 seem	to	clinch	 the	case	
for	my	opponents’	reading,	when	the	Word	says	that	“you	see	nothing	
like	[tu n’en vois rien]”	motive	force.	But	claims	about	what	we	“see”	and	
about	what	 the	 senses	 “tell”	 us	 are	 ambiguous	 between	 representa-
tional	and	epistemic	readings.	On	the	representational	reading,	we	see	
40.	See	also	Doxsee	(1916,	697).
















then	 the	 senses	 represent	 the	 defining	 or	 essential	 fea-
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Moreover,	Malebranche’s	 characterization	of	 the	 senses	as	 “good	
enough	witnesses”	suggests	 that	 this	passage	 is	about	 the	epistemic	
credentials	of	 the	senses	rather	 than	their	 representational	contents.	





not	 represent	 causation,	 then	 that	would	be	a	problem	 for	my	 read-
ing.	But	the	Word	of	God	is	not	unambiguous.	What’s	more,	although	
this	is	an	important	passage,	since	the	Word	is	speaking,	it	is	only	one 
























us	 in	a	position	 to	know	that	p.41	 If	we	read	 “see”	 representationally,	
then	the	Word	would	be	saying	that	we	should	not	judge	that	bodies	
have	causal	powers	because	 the	senses	do	not	 so	much	as	 represent 
one	body	as	causing	another	to	move,	which	would	support	Nadler’s	
reading.	But	we	can	also	 read	 “see”	epistemically,	 in	which	case	 the	
Word	would	be	saying	that	we	should	not	judge	that	bodies	have	caus-
al	powers	because	the	senses	do	not	put us in a position to know that	
the	one	ball	 causes	 the	other	 to	move.	The	senses	could	 fail	 in	 this	
regard	 for	many	reasons,	 for	example,	because	 the	 testimony	of	 the	
senses	is	obscure	and	confused	or	simply	because	the	ball	doesn’t,	by	
Malebranche’s	 lights,	 cause	 the	other	 to	move.42	The	epistemic	 read-






















Malebranche	uses	 the	 literal,	 sense-based	 sense	of	 “see”	 epistemically,	 but	
they	are	suggestive	nonetheless.	
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the	power	 they	attribute	 to	creatures”	 (OC	iii.	294/LO	658;	see	also	
OC	ii.	316/LO	450).	








them.	 But	 even	 if	 two	 events	 are	 conceptually	 and	 metaphysically	
separable,	it	does	not	follow	that	the	senses	cannot	falsely	represent	
these	events	as	causally	and	necessarily	connected,	as	Malebranche	










the	 everyday	 world	 behind.	 He	 preserves	 a	 commonsense	 view	 of	
43.	 For	more	recent	criticism	of	Hume’s	view	that	we	do	not	perceive	causation	






Averroes	 and	 Suárez.	 On	 the	 reading	 defended	 here,	 Malebranche	
holds	that	the	senses	are	dangerous	precisely	because	they	misrepre-
sent	finite	things	as	causally	efficacious.	He	agrees	with	Averroes	and	




that	 collides	with	 another	 is	 the	 true	 cause	of	 the	 second	ball’s	mo-
tion.	He	agrees	that	the	senses	disclose	a	world	made	up	of	“an	infinite	
number	of	little	Divinities”	(OC	x.	56).	But	Malebranche	departs	from	
the	Aristotelians	 in	 holding	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 causality	 is	 false	




astronomers	who	 know	 that	 the	 sun	 is	much	 larger	 than	 the	 earth	
but	who	cannot	help	but	see	the	sun	as	small	or	 like	a	psychologist	
who	 knows	 that	 the	 lines	 of	 the	Müller-Lyer	 illusion	 are	 the	 same	
length	but	cannot	help	but	see	them	as	different.	Even	if	we	come	to	




causes	—	is	 an	 error	of	 the	 senses,	which	 results	 from	unreflectively	
assenting	to	the	way	the	senses	represent	the	world,	in	much	the	same	
way	as	 the	 false	belief	 that	bodies	are	 colored,	 smelly,	 tasty,	 and	 so	
forth	arises	 from	sensory	experiences	 that	 represent	bodies	as	 such	
(OC	ii.	309/LO	446).
This	 is	 not	 to	deny	 that	Malebranche	 influenced	Hume.	As	 com-
mentators	like	McCracken	(1983)	and	Kail	(2008)	have	shown,	Hume	
adapts	many	of	Malebranche’s	arguments	for	his	own	purposes.	But	
Malebranche’s	 influence	 on	Hume	 is	more	 nuanced	 than	 has	 been	
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